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Abstract 
In this dissertation I investigate the private equity sector, analysing the roles that different 
parties play and the valuation process that private equity funds undergo when choosing an 
investment target. In particular, I analyse the role of the issuers of capital, intermediaries and 
partnerships, investors, agents and advisers. I go further and analyse the valuation techniques 
of private equity funds, distinguishing between comparables and asset-based valuation. 
In order to have a pragmatic approach, I support my arguments by introducing a case study 
based on my personal experience as an intern with OVS SpA, a firm operating in the retail 
sector owned by Gruppo Coin, an historic Italian textiles retailer. The Coin family owned the 
majority of the Group since its foundation in the early 1900s until 2005, when the French 
Private Equity fund PAI Partners purchased it. The property of the Group switched hands again 
in 2011, when the Private Equity fund BC Partners bought the company from the rival fund 
PAI Partners in a sponsor to sponsor exit. I analyse the valuation process of BC Partners when 
it was considering the acquisition, and highlight how it contributed to the value creation process 
of the company. 
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Abstract 
In questa Prova Finale analizzo il settore del private equity, concentrandomi sul processo di 
valutazione delle aziende target che i fondi seguono. In particolare, analizzo il ruolo degli 
emittenti di capitali, degli intermediari, degli investitori, degli agenti e dei consulenti. Proseguo 
analizzando le tecniche di valutazione dei fondi di private equity, distinguendo tra il metodo 
dei multipli e metodi asset-based. 
Supporto i miei argomenti introducendo un Case Study basato sulla mia esperienza di 
tirocinante presso OVS SpA, un’azienda operante nel settore del commercio al dettaglio di 
proprietà del Gruppo Coin, uno storico rivenditore di abbigliamento Italiano. La famiglia Coin 
ha avuto il controllo del Gruppo dalla sua fondazione nei primi anni del ’900 fino al 2005, 
quando il fondo di private equity Francese PAI Partners ne acquisì la maggioranza. La proprietà 
del Gruppo cambiò di mano nuovamente nel 2011, quando il fondo di private equity Inglese 
BC Partners acquistò la maggioranza del capitale dal fondo rivale PAI Partners in una exit 
sponsor-to-sponsor. Analizzo il processo di valutazione di BC Partners mentre stava ancora 
considerando l’investimento, ed evidenzio come il fondo ha poi contribuito alla creazione di 
valore dell’azienda. 
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1. Introduction 
Investors’ appetite for private equity has grown throughout the last fifteen years, as public 
markets started to yield lower returns and higher risks. In 1994 the private equity capital 
outstanding was close to $100 billion (Fenn, et al., 1995), while now it stands at $2.5 trillions, 
showing a dramatic growth of this asset class (Preqin, 2017). In 1995 the private equity market 
was already one-sixth of the commercial bank loan and commercial paper markets, and 
outperformed public markets in terms of capital raised. 
Although these numbers are self-explanatory, the industry remains partially opaque because of 
the lack of data available. Private equity investments are often exempt from disclosure 
requirements such as those required by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) for 
public investments in the United States, and despite calls for higher control the sector has no 
interest in increasing its transparency. Furthermore, annual private equity returns are defined 
by some as “meaningless”, as they are the result of accounting procedures and cannot be 
confirmed until the investment is dismissed (Fraser-Sampson, 2007). Therefore, it is important 
to go beyond the figures and understand what really determines private equity performance and 
characteristics. 
 
1.1. What is Private Equity? 
Private equity could be simply defined as “any equity investment in a company which is not 
quoted on a stock exchange” (Fraser-Sampson, 2007), but the reality is much more complicated 
than this. At first, this asset class might have featured only equity as investment type and only 
start ups as targets, but now it has expanded to much more complicated forms (Fenn, et al., 
1995). 
The first distinction that needs to be made is between direct and indirect investing. Direct 
investing consists in acquiring directly private companies, and is usually done by the so-called 
“General Partners”. Indirect investing, on the contrary, consists in investing in funds that 
subsequently acquire the companies. An indirect investment can be made on a primary level, 
or can assume the definition of “fund of funds” when a fund has a portfolio formed by other 
private equity funds. The skill required in this type of partnerships is the capability of choosing 
the fund with the most capable General Partners, and not choosing the best performing 
companies, and therefore it is crucial to make this distinction. Indirect investors are called 
“Limited Partners”, as their risk is limited to their capital commitment and their investment 
style is passive. 
The second distinction that needs to be highlighted is between Buyout funds and Venture 
Capital funds. These two types of funds are important because they cover most of the private 
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equity market, but they are different in their investment style and in their target companies. 
Venture Capital funds target firms at their first stages of development in innovative sectors, and 
help them to structure themselves with their skills, knowledge and network. Buyout funds, 
which cover a higher market share, target companies of medium size that are already established 
in traditional sectors. These funds are known for buying company aggressively, and taking 
harsh measures, like employees’ laying off, in order to improve profitability. They are also 
known for using the “buy, flip and strip” method, which consists in buying companies, stripping 
them off of their assets and flipping them over to another buyer, or listing them on the stock 
market through an IPO (Investopedia, s.d.). For these reasons private equity funds have partially 
lost their good reputation as shareholders that they could once claim, and now entrepreneurs 
are holding themselves back from selling companies to these types of funds.  
Some of the instruments used other than equity are convertible debt, mezzanine instruments 
and leveraged buyouts. These innovative ways to invest in private companies have raised a need 
to reclassify private equity, that Preqin defined as follows (Preqin, 2017): 
 
Source: 2016 Preqin Global Private Equity and Venture Capital Report 
Invest Europe, the association representing European private equity that was formerly called 
EVCA, adds that “Private equity is a medium to long-term investment, characterised by 
active ownership.  Private equity builds better businesses by strengthening management 
expertise, delivering operational improvements and helping companies to access new markets.” 
(Invest Europe, s.d.). This is precisely the main difference between private equity and asset 
management as commonly intended, which is characterized by shorter holding periods and 
passive ownership that rarely adds value to the firm. The direct relationship between 
performance and reward in private equity funds makes them also more reliable than publicly 
owned companies, where agency problems often cause a misalignment of interests between 
managers and owners. This results in higher transparency and attractiveness towards possible 
lenders and investors, that are willing to provide cheap capital in exchange for a steady and 
consistent return. 
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1.2. History of Private Equity 
In order to understand the industry of private equity today, it is fundamental to look at how it 
started and how it developed throughout the years. 
Private equity origins can be dated back to 1946 in the United States, when American Research 
and Development Corporation (ARD) was formed with the goal of providing long-term 
financing to new ventures and small businesses (Hsu & Kenney, 2005). Institutional investors 
were not interested in this asset class at the time, and therefore the company struggled to raise 
funds in order to make its investments. 
In 1958 the  gave rise to new public juridical entities, the Small Business Investment Companies 
(Gadsby, 1958). These companies specialized in providing professionally managed capital to 
small and risky firms, and were granted tax reliefs from the State in exchange for the 
commitment of investing only in small sized firms. SBICs managed $450 million of private 
capital, and interested mainly retail investors who could not properly assess the risks involved 
in these transactions. However, SBICs were not able to attract capable professionals because 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 managers of publicly traded venture capital firms 
could not be compensated proportionally to their performance, or with stock options (Lick, 
2000). 
This issue led to the creation in the 1970s of the Limited Partnership model, which was able to 
avoid the compensation restrictions, but also SBICs’ commitment to invest only in small sized 
firms. Although this new model seemed to facilitate private equity flexibility, the weak market 
for public offerings, the bearish stock market and a series of tax changes that made stock option 
really expensive held back the private equity market for the decade, until the Employee 
Retirement Security Act (ERISA) was changed in the beginning of the 1980s. The changes 
made allowed pension funds to allocate part of their portfolio in private equity, an asset class 
that they were prevented from purchasing previous to that date (Ljungqvist & Richardson, 
2003). Venture capital partnerships used to raise less than $3 million per year before ERISA’s 
change, while the year after its implementation the net capital raised was $50 million. In 
addition to this regulatory change, in 1980 the Small Business Incentive Act reclassified private 
equity partnerships as business development companies, making the professional managers 
exempt from the registration as advisers in compliance with the Investment Advisers Act, which 
would have posed many limitations to the flexibility of the funds. 
Starting from the 1980s, private equity partnerships saw a dramatic increase in the capital 
raised, which went from $4 billion at the start of the decade to $19 billion in 1994. Even though 
this increased interest in private equity benefit both venture and non venture funds, the sector 
that raised more interest was the non venture private equity. The main contributors to these 
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stunning numbers are the so-called “mega buyout funds”, which started in 1987 with Kohlberg, 
Kravis and Roberts raising $5.6 billion for their fund (Kaufman & Englander, 1993), and 
creating a global investment firm now worth $15 billion with $130 billion Assets Under 
Management (AUM). 
 
New commitments to private equity partnerships 
Source: The Economics of the Private Equity Market 
 
In the decade preceding the .dotcom bubble stock prices raised vertiginously, especially those 
of technology companies, making buyout expansion more expensive and less profitable. One 
example of such phenomenon is the $31 billion Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) of RJR Nabisco by 
KKR in 1988 (DeMott, 1989), that showed also how buyouts were often motivated more by 
management’s greed than by economic reasons, following Gordon Gekko’s motto “Greed is 
good”. In this period, venture capital made a comeback as it required smaller investments and 
had a higher profit potential. 
When the .dotcom bubble burst, stock prices collapsed and made big scale investments more 
attractive. The record buyout of RJR Nabisco was outsized twice in 2007 alone, and investors 
piled up again in private equity funds. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made public companies look 
less attractive, as it imposed strict regulations on financial statements disclosures and gave to 
auditors higher responsibility (Engel, et al., 2007). It also changed the way private equity funds 
monetized their investments, as IPOs became less appealing and sales to strategic buyers gained 
popularity (Bain & Co., 2017). 
When private equity was prospering with many megadeals outstanding, the Credit Crisis of 
2007 broke out. The housing market crashed and all the Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs) lost the collateral on which they relied in case of a repayment failure. It soon became 
convenient to debtors to default their loans, as the payments due for their housing loans now 
outweighed the value of their house. Banks were heavily exposed on CDOs, which they both 
held in their portfolios and sold to their clients. When the market crashed and they had to write 
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down a consistent number of their assets, they soon realised that they were undercapitalized or 
on the edge of bankruptcy. In situations of financial distress, banks protect themselves by 
tightening credit standards, closing credit lines with lower quality borrowers and raising loan 
interest rates. Private equity funds’ LBOs required a high level of leverage that had been 
historically provided by banks with long-term loans, and were now forced to either cancel the 
deals they had planned or low their bid offer (Fenn, et al., 1995). Cerberus Capital Partners 
struggle to find the funds to finance its acquisition of the Chrysler Group, and the consortium 
of Bain Capital Partners, The Carlyle Group, and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice had to lower their 
offer for the Wholesale Supply Unit of Home Depot Inc. from $10.5 billion to $8.5 billion. 
The shock of the Credit Crisis hit the industry really hard, and led General Partners to write 
down many of their investments. They also had to hold back the sale of their previous 
investments both because of the low market prices, and in order to balance for the high prices 
paid for the companies bought just before 2007 (PwC, 2017). The number of exits seen in 2006 
was reached again only in 2014, indicating that private equity has now recovered its losses, but 
that it definitely took some time to do so. 
 
1.3. Current Trends in Private Equity 
AUM of private equity funds are at an all-time high, totalling $2.49 trillion in 2016. To confirm 
that the industry is larger than ever, dry powder rose at $820 billion (Preqin, 2017). $347 billion 
of capital raised in 2016 outweighs the $257 billion of distributions, showing that private equity 
still attracts more investors than those that it can satisfy. In contrast with these figures, in 2016 
private equity deal value in Europe decreased by 5% to €200 billion, showing that the industry 
was unable to replicate the stunning performance it had in 2015 (PwC, 2017). This is the result 
of a lower number of mega deals, which dropped by almost 20% YoY. 
However, it is fundamental to look at the long-term prospects, that show a Compounded 
Average Growth Rate of more than 4% per year since 2011. What is helping the industry to 
grow and prosper is the amount of fresh capital raised every year, and the cheap credit that 
funds can have access to in order to finance their acquisitions. This low cost of debt comes from 
the financial manoeuvre that the European Central Bank started in January 2015, the 
quantitative easing. This program consists in the purchase of bonds issued by states and 
corporation, for a record amount of €60 billion per month (Claeys, et al., 2015). 
Private equity changed a lot in the last decade, as the financial crisis proved how harsh this 
sector can be hit from external shocks. In particular, the importance of correct valuations has 
gained relevance, as in the years before the financial crisis funds sought to buy companies at 
any price, pushed by the high amount of dry powder they had accumulated. Furthermore, the 
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focus has been shifted from financial engineering and leverage to operational improvements 
(Matthews, et al., 2009), which now represent the core of companies’ development and are 
reflected in the valuation methods that heavily rely on EBITDA as a multiple. The average 
EV/EBITDA multiple stands now at X10 both in the US and in Europe, setting a new all time 
record and helping us to understand why exit values are declining and dry powder is rising. 
Holding periods have also become longer, but only due to the fact that the financial crisis has 
made it extremely difficult to pay back to investors even the initial commitment. However, only 
10% of capital invested before the crisis still sits in unrealized deals, indicating that holding 
period will start to shorten to more physiological levels (Bain & Co., 2017). 
Overall, private equity is experiencing a situation that it never encountered before. The 
quantitative easing manoeuvre has kept interest rates artificially low for a while, but private 
equity will have to deal with a higher cost of debt once the buying programme slowly comes to 
an end. Furthermore, the macroeconomic outlook increases uncertainty on where private equity 
will perform best, as the United Kingdom will be on the watch during its negotiations to exit 
the European Union. New markets are opening, and as fundraising is heating up the sector 
investors will be looking for new investment opportunities. If unrealized deals will find a 
favourable exit environment, it is likely that we will see exit values and numbers rise 
significantly. 
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2. The Private Equity Market 
In the private equity market there are many actors, and each of them has a relevant and unique 
role. The issuers of capital are the companies subject to acquisition, that are acquired and held 
for a certain period until a suitable buyer is found. The intermediaries are the private equity 
funds, who raise capital from investors and acquire companies in order to generate a return.  
They can be structured in a variety of ways and are formed by experienced professionals that 
charge fees for the service that they provide. Private equity investors can be both individuals or 
legal entities who act on behalf of their investors. Their only role is to provide capital and wait 
until the investments are realized. Finally, agents and advisers have the role to reduce the costs 
related to information asymmetries present in the market. 
2.1. Issuers 
The issuers are the companies acquired by the private equity funds. They can be classified by 
size and maturity, and can be subject to different kinds of changes (Ippolito, et al., 2017). The 
common trait of these issuers is that they often have a lack of financing, as private equity is 
considered as an expensive funding source and is often avoided for this reason (Fenn, et al., 
1995). They also operate in highly innovative sectors, where the more conservative sources of 
finance are resilient to invest. 
 
Source: IKB. "Mezzanine Method of Financing. Round Table Talks", Deutsche Industriebank October 2003 
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2.2. Intermediaries 
Intermediaries are those entities that raise funds from investors and select the targets to be 
acquired. The proceeds from the exits go back to the investors, but intermediaries charge a 
commission for the service they provide (Cumming & Johan, 2013). Since the beginning of 
private equity, many forms of intermediaries have been on the market. The Small Business 
Investment Companies were the first to be established, but did not find a favourable 
environment (Brewer & Genay, 1995). Limited Partnerships were then created in the 1970s, 
but their role was limited in the beginning because most private equity investments were made 
directly by industrial companies that aimed to expand their businesses through mergers and 
acquisitions rather than internal development. Nowadays this market still exists, but it is much 
smaller when compared to that of partnerships and institutional investors. The Partnership 
model had a great success when pension funds were allowed to partially invest in them. Since 
then, Limited Partnerships have become the dominant structure for private equity investments, 
and therefore it is more relevant to concentrate on this specific structure. 
2.2.1. Limited	Partnerships	
Limited Partnerships are agreements between two parties, called “Limited Partners” (LPs) and 
“General Partners” (GPs), that set the terms for the investment agreement. In this structure, LPs 
have the only role of committing capital, while GPs are the managers that actually carry on the 
investment decisions. LPs are often pension and investment funds, which are required by law 
to not participate in the active management of their investments as this would imply a 
significant risk that they are not allowed to incur by statute. This is one of the main reasons 
why Limited Partnerships gained popularity over SBICs and other kind of organizational 
structures, and why they now cover most of the private equity market. In most cases, General 
Partners do not act privately, but on behalf of a management firm. 
2.2.2. Investment	Process	
There is no set process that Limited Partnerships have to go through when investing, as it 
depends entirely on the clauses of the specific agreement. However, it is possible to distinguish 
a common practice of private equity funds in their investment process. 
Management firms create Limited Partnerships that usually target a specific sector and a 
specific geographical region, and look for investors that are interested in such characteristics. 
Once enough capital is committed, that does not require an actual cash contribution, the fund is 
“launched” and is usually attributed with a name and the vintage year, which is marked by the 
year in which the capital is contributed. After the initial commitment, the capital is drawn down 
to the fund when the General Partners make a “capital call” (Fraser-Sampson, 2007). The 
capital can be used for both investments in target companies and fee expenses, but cannot be 
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held as cash reserves. After the draw downs, GPs use the capital requested to invest in the target 
firms. Finally, the proceeds from the sales of the target companies and the cash received from 
dividends and interests are distributed to the LPs, that realize the investments in this way. 
 
Source: Fraser-Sampson, 2007. Private Equity as an Asset Class 
The timing of these commitments can vary widely depending on the specific situation of the 
funds and the target companies, but Limited Partnerships are usually structured to last ten to 
twelve years. Given the average holding period of five years, GPs do not need to invest the 
drawn down capital right away, but can wait a limited amount of years if the market does not 
show valid investing options. 
2.2.3. Management	Fees	
General Partners earn a compensation for their role in managing the fund from the commitments 
to the distributions. No fixed rule exists for setting the fees owed by the LPs, but throughout 
the years the market developed some common practices that are followed by the majority of 
partnerships. The fees are divided between management fees and carried interest (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010). The former is a percentage fee, normally from 1% to 3%, on the overall capital 
that has been invested. The latter is owed only after LPs are paid back their initial investment 
by the GPs, and consists in a percentage on the return, normally 20%, that the fund yields to 
the partners. This can be seen as a call option-like position, as GPs have the right to earn a 
return only if the shares of the company are above a certain level (Potter & Bodmer, 2011). 
2.2.4. Conflicts	of	Interest	
Controversies on compensation have made the relationship between the GPs and LPs not so 
simple, with GPs holding virtually infinite bargaining power. In particular, the debate focuses 
on whether the commissions should be based on committed or invested capital, as in the past 
GPs charged fees on the committed capital which they didn't necessarily use entirely. In the 
recent years LPs have stepped up and made a number of changes to the partnerships conditions, 
putting themselves in a more favourable position by, for instance, paying carried interest on the 
entire portfolio rather than on single investments, compensating the eventual losses with gains 
on other investments. 
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2.3. Investors 
The interest raised by private equity reaches a wide variety of investors, such as pension funds, 
bank holding companies and wealthy families. Average individuals were once precluded from 
this kind of investment as it required a significant minimum commitment, but now they also 
have this investment possibility as many private equity vehicles are publicly traded on the stock 
market and can be bought and sold freely. 
 
Source: Preqin 
The ease of investing and the growing interest in this sector are heating up the market and 
increasing the amount of dry powder (Preqin, 2017). For this reason, some US pension funds 
are reducing their exposure to this asset class (Pooley & Mooney, 2017) and are shifting 
towards different, more liquid options. These pension funds have the highest share of 
ownerships in private equity funds, and contribute to the fundraising in a significant way. It is 
worth analysing why pension funds position themselves so heavily in private equity from a 
closer perspective. 
2.3.1. Pension	Funds	
A pension fund is an investment product into which scheme members pay contributions in order 
to build up a lump sum to provide an income in retirement (Wall, 2014). It normally has a 
diversified composition, as it needs to cover a long period of time guaranteeing its members 
their retirement income. In order to do this, it invests in bonds and treasuries, public and private 
equity, real estate, infrastructure and financial derivatives (Whiteside, 2016). 
However, pension funds have not always invested in private equity. The provision of the 
“prudent man” required that pension fund investments be based on the judgment of a “prudent 
man” and had been previously interpreted as prohibiting pension fund investments in securities 
issued by small or new companies and venture capital funds. In 1979 the Labor Department 
ruled that such investments are permitted, provided that they do not endanger an entire 
portfolio. As previously stated in the introduction, this regulatory change, accompanied also by 
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a favourable tax change, helped pension funds to allocate a significant part of their funds in 
private equity and pushed the notoriety and appeal of this asset class. Today, pension funds 
often allocate more than 10% of their portfolios in illiquid assets such as private equity, real 
estate and infrastructure (Paula & Croce, 2015) both to increase diversification and to look for 
higher returns.  
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3. Valuation 
Private equity investments are, by nature, confidential and not public. These investments are 
not traded on public equity markets and therefore do not have a market value on which to rely 
on when evaluating possible investments and when assessing the performance of the ones in 
progress. This lack of available information raises the need to develop appropriate valuation 
techniques that satisfy both financial reporting requirements and investors’ demand for 
information to make correct economic decisions.  The result of these valuation techniques is 
often referred to as “Fair Value” which, as the name suggests, has the scope to reflect the real 
economic value of the investments. 
 
3.1. Fair Value 
Fair Value is defined by the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation 
Guidelines as the price that would be received to sell an asset in an orderly transaction between 
market participants at the measurement date (IPEV, 2015). When a market for the investment 
exists, the market price should be used exclusively as the fair value in IPEV’s opinion. For 
unquoted investments, it is necessary to calculate the price at which the investments could be 
realised or sold at the measurement date. However, there are some cases that do not properly 
fall in either of these categories. Listed firms can sometimes have only a small part of their 
capital floating, while the majority held privately. In these cases, the valuation process does not 
take in consideration only the market price in order to determine the fair value, but looks also 
at other factors that can be relevant. This adjustment is necessary because a small, liquid share 
of the capital of a firm is valued differently from the illiquid majority of it. 
Consistency in the type of fair value calculation techniques should be used when evaluating the 
same investments at different measurement dates. However, consistency is not required when 
valuing companies operating in different sectors because traditional valuation methods might 
not work well for certain business models. In particular, Borsa Italiana highlights the difficulty 
in evaluating banks, insurance companies, aviation companies, real estate companies, power 
and energy firms, TMT companies and biotechnology companies with the traditional valuation 
methods (Borsa Italiana, 2004). 
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3.2. Principles of Valuation 
The fair value of an investment should be assessed at each reporting date both in the interest of 
Limited Partners and General Partners. In this way, LPs are constantly informed about the 
performance of their portfolio and GPs can evaluate their progress and check if they are meeting 
their initial expectations for fair value, hurdle rate and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
Furthermore, GPs base their calculation of carried interest on the fair value reported at each 
measurement date, and therefore it is in their best interest to provide a periodic fair value. 
While public companies are valued taking in consideration only the equity part, private 
companies should be considered as a whole. The rationale for this is that in private equity value 
is realised through an exit from the whole company, not just a part of it. Because of this, debt 
and mezzanine instruments should also be considered in the valuation process and contribute 
to the definition of the Enterprise Value (EV). The ways these instruments should be considered 
are highly debatable, as many options can be chosen depending on the specific case. For 
instance, debt can be considered with its face value or its par value depending on the agreements 
of the loan, like whether it should be repaid in the case of the sale of the company. 
Fair value estimates should be compared both with those of comparable public investments and 
with the same investment’s fair value of previous measurement dates. This second method is 
called “backtesting”, and consists in continuously assessing the validity of the first fair value 
estimate in order to reflect the true value of the investment. In order to do this, a comparison 
with public events of comparable companies should be used together with the internal valuation 
process. 
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3.3. Valuation Methods 
The choice of the valuation method should be made with judgement, as there is no fixed rule to 
follow that indicates which method to use. An appropriate valuation technique will include all 
relevant factors to the value of the investment, and should be appropriate to the nature of the 
investments and the market in which it operates. Furthermore, the data and information used 
should be reliable and compatible with the investment under scrutiny. The factors that should 
be included are risk and return, and they should be drawn from observable market measures 
before internal assumptions. 
There are two types of valuations that can be made: the market approach and the income 
approach (IPEV, 2015). These methods are not necessarily alternatives, but they can be used 
conjunctly in order to achieve a more reliable and comprehensive valuation. 
3.3.1. Market	Approach	
3.3.1.1. Price	of	Recent	Investments	
This valuation technique consists in using the price of recent investments in the company under 
valuation as a benchmark. It is particularly fit when the investments made are recent and of 
significant dimensions, while loses significance when the environment is particularly dynamic 
or the market conditions have changed since the transaction took place. 
The use of minority stakes as a benchmark can result in an undervaluation of the company 
because the price of minority stakes often reflects the lack of bargaining power. However, when 
the price of the minority stake is the only one available, it is important to look at the statute of 
the specific company, as minority’s rights can be structured in a wide variety of ways. The more 
rights the minorities have been granted, the more reliable the price of the transaction will be 
when valuing the entity as a whole. 
The price of an outdated investment in the company can be irrelevant depending also on its life 
stage. New ventures and start ups, in particular those operating in the technology sector, have 
such a high growth rate that their value can rise significantly even in a short period of time. 
3.3.1.2. Multiples	
The multiples valuation technique is based upon the assumption that the value of a firm can be 
measured by using economic, patrimonial and financial multiples of comparable firms. The 
multiple can be historical, current or forecasted for the future, and relies on fundamental values 
such as Price/Earnings, EV/EBIT or EV/EBITDA.  The economic rationale underlying the 
method is the law of one price, which says that two identical assets should sell at the same price. 
It is easily understandable how important is the choice of the comparable firms, and how an 
incorrect choice could heavily undermine the significance of the valuation. Furthermore, the 
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investment should have a constant and maintainable stream of revenue and cash flow in order 
for the valuation to be appropriate. 
The steps that need to be taken when using the multiples approach are the following: 
1. identify comparable firms to use as a benchmark. This implies selecting firms from the 
same sector, of similar size and at a similar maturity stage; 
2. identify relevant and traditional value drivers (e.g. Price-Earnings, Price-Book Value, 
EV/EBITDA, cash flow) or use other industry specific value drivers (e.g. stores sale 
density, oil/gas reserves); 
3. make the following adjustments if necessary: 
a. unleveraging (a higher leverage leads to a higher cost of capital), 
b. dilute EPS for non-ordinary shares outstanding, 
c. make adjustments for accounting-induced differences; 
4. calculate the peer multiple excluding ‘abnormal’ values and calculate the mean or 
median; 
5. apply the benchmark multiple to the firm’s corresponding value driver. 
 
This method has the main advantage to be simple and easily implementable, but it comes with 
many assumptions, need for adjustments and judgemental choices to be made. First of all, the 
multiples approach assumes that market or transaction prices of other investments are efficient 
and truly represent the underlying business. Secondly, in addition to the adjustments described 
above, the valuer should take in consideration eventual accounting discrepancies between firms 
reporting under different jurisdictions. Thirdly, the impact of liquidity needs to be assessed and 
taken in consideration when conducting the valuation. Furthermore, the choice of the 
comparable firms is completely judgemental, indicating that the reliability of the valuation 
depends on the ability of the valuer in the sample choice. Finally, an appropriate selection of 
the multiples used is crucial to the significance of the valuation. 
3.3.2. Income	Approach	
3.3.2.1. Discounted	Cash	Flow	
The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method is the most accredited by modern corporate finance 
theories, as it correlates the value of the firm to its capability of producing an adequate level of 
cash flow and to remunerate its investors. The intrinsic value of the investment is derived by 
calculating the present value of the forecasted cash flows of the underlying business. In 
particular, the process for calculating the intrinsic value is the following: 
1. Forecast the future operational cash flows up to a determined forecast horizon, and 
discount them to the present by using the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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(WACC). Estimate a growth rate of cash flows after the determined forecast horizon, 
and calculate the terminal value (TV) of these cash flows discounted at the 
measurement date; 
2. Calculate the Net Financial Position (NFP) at the market value; 
3. Calculate the intrinsic value of the firm using the following formula: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐶𝐹/(1 +𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)/ + 𝑇𝑉 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃:/;<  
 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐶𝐹/(1 +𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)/ + 𝑇𝑉:/;<  
Operating Cash Flows 
The operating cash flows are calculated starting from Earnings Before Interests and Tax (EBIT) 
and adjusting it for the following factors: 
 EBIT 
- taxes on operational result 
+ depreciation 
+ working capital changes 
- investments in fixed capital 
= Operational Cash Flows 
 
The weighted average cost of capital is calculated with the following formula: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟A ∗ 1 − 𝑇 ∗ 𝐷𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝑟D ∗ 𝐸𝐷 + 𝐸 
where re represents the cost of equity, rd represents the cost of debt, T represents the corporate 
tax rate, D represents the net financial position and E represents the value of equity. 
The cost of equity is often calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which 
uses the risk free rate, the market return and the stock’s Beta to calculate re as follows: 𝑟D = 𝑟E + 𝐵 ∗ (𝑟G − 𝑟E) 
When dealing with private investments the stock’s Beta is not available, as the investment is 
not listed on a public market. For this reason, it is useful to use the average Beta of a sample of 
comparable firms. 
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Terminal Value 
The calculation of the terminal value, the value representing the cash flow after the forecasting 
horizon, can be determined with two main variables: the cash flow at the forecast horizon and 
an estimated growth rate. With these two variables, it is possible to compute the terminal value 
as following: 𝑇𝑉 = 𝐶𝐹: ∗ (1 + 𝑔)𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔(1 +𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶):  
As it can be inferred from the formula, also the terminal value needs to be discounted at the 
measurement date in order to obtain a correct valuation. As in the multiples valuation method, 
judgement is needed when estimating the cash flow growth rate after the forecast horizon. 
 
Net Financial Position 
The net financial position is calculated subtracting cash and equivalents from the overall 
financial debt. When applicable, the market value of debt should be used instead of its face 
value. 
 
The DCF technique can be applied to any stream of cash flows, and is suitable for firms in any 
maturity stage. Even firms that have negative earnings and that are in a high growth phase can 
be valued properly when accurate estimations of cash flows are made. 
Although this method is theoretically the most accurate one, it is not exempt from applicative 
issues. The first issue is the reliability of prospective, forward-looking estimates of cash flows. 
It is particularly hard to accurately forecast them when a firm is under restructuring or when it 
is developing new products or services because of the uncertainty underlying this processes. 
The problematic of choosing a correct Beta is also relevant, as many factors contribute to its 
value. When choosing the comparable firm, it is necessary to take into account the dimension 
of the firm, its position on the market and the gearing level. The horizon forecast needs also to 
be chosen with specific criteria, and should coincide with the Competitive Advantage Period 
(CAP) which end is marked by the year when the firm ceases to have a differential competitive 
advantage. A particular emphasis should be also given to the terminal value calculation, that 
the DCF calculates taking in consideration only a single growth rate. Many other elements have 
a relevant impact on the terminal value such as the growth of revenue, the growth of operative 
margins and the fixed and working capital investments, and they all need to be considered when 
applying the valuation process. 
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3.3.2.2. EVA®	-	Economic	Value	Added	
The Economic Value Added model is a methodology used to evaluate how much value was 
created for shareholders. It was first created because accounting values are often insignificant 
and have implicit limitations because of the prudential nature of the accounting system. In 
particular, the model seeks to find the residual profit after deducting the cost of equity from the 
overall profit of the firm. It can be implanted as following: 𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 − (𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐸) 
where NOPAT is the Net Operating Profit After Tax, WACC is the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital and CE is the Capital Employed. The formula can also be rearranged in this way: 𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐸 −𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐸 
It is therefore clear that the EVA relies heavily on the remuneration of capital, which is 
represented by the factor JKLMNOP . 
The Economic Value Added can be forecasted for each year in the same way we did with 
Discounted Cash Flows. Once these values are forecasted and discounted back to the 
measurement date, we obtain the Market Added Value (MVA), which represents the current 
value of the excess performance that the firm will generate in the future. 
The EVA is considered more reliable than the DCF because it is not based only on forward-
looking estimates, but also on past investments and on the industrial plan produced by the firm 
itself. 
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3.4. Fund Inflows Impact on Valuations 
The valuation methods previously described have the goal to derive a unique, objective estimate 
of the value of an investment. However, the basic macroeconomic theory tells us that the value 
of any good depends on the demand and the offer for it. For this reasons, many studies have 
tried to understand whether the demand for private equity investments has an impact on the 
valuation of the acquired firms. This issue became particularly relevant after the inflow of funds 
derived from the permission to pension funds to invest in this asset class that boosted 
fundraising and investments. A study by Gompers tested this hypothesis on the US private 
equity market, and came to two main conclusions (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). First, inflows in 
venture capital funds are proved to have an impact on the pricing of private equity investments. 
Second, the positive relationship between fundraising and prices does not derive from increased 
investment prospects perception. 
These findings raise questions about the role of the state in the performance of specific asset 
classes and specific countries, in particular the developing ones. These phenomena might have 
a relevant impact in the first place, but they can survive only if their performance justifies the 
investments. In fact, in the recent years pension funds are diminishing their allocation in private 
equity (Pooley & Mooney, 2017) as over commitments have pushed market prices up and 
returns down. 
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4. Case Study: BC Partners acquires Gruppo Coin 
After having explained in depth how the valuation process in private equity works, an empirical 
case study will be useful to comprehend how investment decisions are carried out by private 
equity funds. I have chosen to analyse the acquisition of Gruppo Coin by the private equity firm 
BC Partners of 2011 after my experience as an intern with OVS S.p.A., a firm controlled by 
Gruppo Coin, during last summer. My role in the Finance department and Investors Relations 
office allowed me to achieve an in-depth knowledge of the business and a broad understanding 
of how the firm is managed by its executives and investors. 
 
4.1. Deal Background 
Gruppo Coin started in 1919 with its founder, Vittorio Coin, selling clothes and textiles in the 
local markets of Venice. In 1926 he opened the first shop in Mirano, starting its project of 
opening a chain of department stores. 
In 1958 the company started to expand out of the regional borders, and in the 1960s and 1970s 
it increased its presence in all the northern Italy and a few cities in the south with 19 new 
department stores. In these years, specifically in 1952, a new division of the firm called 
"oviesse"1 is constituted, with the goal of selling at discounted prices the articles that went 
unsold in Coin stores. The development continued with the shift to professional management 
and the listing on the Italian Stock Exchange in 1999. 
In 2000 the Group expands in Germany and Switzerland through the acquisition of more than 
120 stores, but in 2003 it is forced to dismiss all of the activities abroad because the results did 
not meet management's expectations. 
In 2005 the private equity fund PAI Partners acquires the majority of Gruppo Coin and decides 
to change management, appointing as Chief Executive Officer Stefano Beraldo. Thanks to the 
new owners and the newly appointed management, Gruppo Coin goes through a period of 
dramatic change and development. The brand "oviesse" is changed to "OVS" and a new attempt 
of international expansion is made, this time in Eastern Europe and Middle East. In 2008 and 
2009 the acquisitions of Melablu and Upim are respectively finalized, and in 2011 the luxury 
department store "Excelsior" is opened. 
In June 2011, the British private equity firm BC Partners announces the acquisition of 78.7% 
of share capital of Gruppo Coin for €730 million (BC Partners, 2011). BC Partners also 
launched a mandatory tender offer of €6.50 per share, that makes up for an overall equity value 
of Gruppo Coin of €930 million. The deal comprises also a new facilities agreement with a 
                                                
1 Which stands for "Organizzazione Vendite Speciale" that means "Organization for Special Sales” 
 25 
consortium of banks for an overall maximum amount of €650 million of loans. At the moment 
of the acquisition, Gruppo Coin traded on the stock market for €7.50 per share, meaning that 
the offer discounted the value by almost 15%. Despite this undervaluation, BC Partners was 
able to purchase more than 95% of the capital of Gruppo Coin and therefore became entitled 
by law to purchase also the remaining shares (Equita SIM, 2011). In the September of 2011 
Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock Market, suspended Gruppo Coin from the trading, and marked 
the conclusion of the deal with the complete control of BC Partners over the Group. 
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4.2. Due Diligence 
Before entering in the bidding process for the acquisition, BC Partners went through a complete 
and detailed valuation process that analyses the Country and the market in which Gruppo Coin 
operates, and then its business with its specific brands and their potential for growth. This 
process is called “due diligence”, and its ultimate goal is to estimate the deal’s potential in a 
realistic way (Bain & Company, s.d.). First of all, it is necessary to formulate an investment 
thesis, which establishes reasons and goals for the investment and sets the timeline for its 
dismissal. From the operational perspective, it is useful to assess revenue growth and cost 
reduction possibilities, which can be implemented in different ways such as mergers and 
acquisitions or internal development. Based on these estimations, the impact on cash flow and 
profit and loss can be estimated and quantified, and with these data the valuation methodologies 
previously discussed can be easily implemented to find the intrinsic value of the firm. 
4.2.1. Market	Overview	
Italy represented the biggest apparel market of Europe, with a reference market for Gruppo 
Coin of about €29 billion. The stable spending per capita and a Compounded Average Growth 
Rate (CAGR) higher than any other European country, make this market a strategic and 
appealing one. Furthermore, the penetration rate of modern trade, considered as department 
stores, specialised chains and large apparel retailers, stood at 44%, well below the European 
average. This indicated a relatively higher potential growth for Gruppo Coin compared to its 
peers in the old continent that have to deal with highly concentrated market with penetration 
rates as high as 74% in the UK. The growth in modern trade will be mostly at the expenses of 
traditional trade, considered as independent retailers, because of their decreasing appeal and 
financial constraints. 
 Gruppo Coin, operating through its brands Coin, OVS and, from 2009, Upim, has had a 
growing market share during the three years from 2006 to 2009. It has also outperformed its 
main competitors, namely Benetton, Inditex and H&M, in market share gains. 
	 2006 2007 2008 2009 
OVS 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 
Coin 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 
Upim       1.0% 
Gruppo Coin 4.0% 4.3% 4.5% 5.7% 
Source: Euromonitor 
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4.2.2. Business	Overview	
At the end of 2010, Gruppo Coin had a network of 519 directly operated stores and 320 
franchisees operating under three brands: OVS, Coin and Upim. Its multiformat business 
structure expands in different markets, respectively fast fashion retail, department store and 
multispecialist department store. 
As of 2010, Gruppo Coin had the following performance: 
€mln OVS Coin Upim Gruppo Coin 
Net Sales 903.60 302.80 440.10 1646.50 
% on Group's Net Sales 54.9% 18.4% 26.7% 100.0% 
EBITDA 155.30 23.70 46.60 225.60 
% on Net Sales 17.2% 7.8% 10.6% 13.7% 
Source: 2010 Company Financials 
4.2.2.1. OVS	
OVS is Italy's leading group in the “fast fashion” clothing market, creating, developing and 
marketing menswear, womenswear and childrenswear under the OVS brand, targeting the 
“value for money” segment. OVS was able to develop a great mutual trust with customers, 
achieving brand awareness on the Italian market equal to 97% in 2013 (Doxa). 
OVS’s business model is typical of vertically-integrated retailer and involves the activity of 
product development through the design, development and creation of the merchandise mix 
(OVS, s.d.). The design of the products is carried out mostly internally, but throughout the years 
OVS has developed partnerships with selected designers like Elio Fiorucci and Jean Paul 
Gaultier in order to diversify its product offer and increase its appeal. Last year, OVS has started 
the project “OVS Arts of Italy” with aim of giving value to the Italian artistic heritage by 
printing art masterpieces on its product offering. The manufacturing of the products is mainly 
commissioned through external suppliers of Low Cost Countries (LCCs), a strategy that has 
allowed OVS to beat its competitors in price and quality, thanks to its developed sourcing 
platform. OVS S.p.A. operates through its own sales network comprising Directly Operated 
Stores (DOS) in the national territory and franchised stores both in the national territory and 
abroad. 
The brand OVS is the result of a rebranding process which took place in 2007, when the new 
OVS Industry model was implemented in the firm’s store network. The goal of the process was 
to give a younger and more fashionable concept to its offering, entering in direct competitions 
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with retailers like Inditex and H&M. The format change has generated sales per squared meter 
15% higher than previous to the change, that, given OVS’s higher than average store size, puts 
the company more in line with its direct competitors. 
BC Partners took control in 2011 and attempted to develop the business through different 
strategies. An important impact on the company’s results were the acquisitions of Unitessile 
S.p.A. and Bernardi, respectively in 2011 and 2012. Unitessile S.p.A. owned the kids brand 
“IANA” that had a network of 397 outlets, comprising 45 directly operated stores and 150 
franchised stores. Bernardi, again operating in the kids’ segment, owned the brands “Bernardi” 
and “Go Kids”, and featured a total of over 100 stores. These acquisitions were crucial in 
increasing the Net Sales but, due to the different business structures and cost management 
systems, had a negative impact on the EBITDA margin. 
4.2.2.2. Upim	
Upim is a multispecialist chain of mid-low market department stores offering apparel products, 
home products, cosmetics and leisure products under various brands. Its focus and goal is to 
satisfy the needs of traditional Italian families at affordable prices, defining itself as a 
“democratic brand” (Upim, s.d.). Upim was acquired by Gruppo Coin from one of its 
competitors, La Rinascente, and a few other investors in 2009. 
Upim’s unique characteristics are not its brand, its product offering, or its sourcing platform, 
but the prime location of its stores. They are mainly located in high quality areas, where there 
is a lack of available commercial spaces, and hence are of a strong strategic relevance. Because 
they have a limited overlapping with OVS stores, they constitute a possible target for 
conversions into OVS or Coin stores, which have 30% and 50% higher profitability per squared 
meter, respectively. At the time of acquisition, Gruppo Coin’s plan was to convert 66 stores 
into OVS Industry, 12 stores into Coin, to close 15 stores, to leave 15 stores under the brand 
BlueKids and to convert 42 stores in Upim POP, a new format that comprises 50% of 
commercial spaces given to concessions, 30% to clothing under the OVS Industry standards 
and 20% to home and cosmetics. 
The cost synergies that will arise from the closure of Upim headquarters in Milan generated a 
saving of €25 million, while those arising from the shared sourcing platform and the use of 
common assets were estimated to contribute for another €25 million. The management expected 
that the integration of Upim into the Group would contribute for €427.5 million to Net Sales 
and €13.8 million to EBITDA. 
4.2.2.3. Coin	
Coin is the largest chain of department stores in Italy, comprising more than 40 directly 
operated stores. The stores are located in major city centres and shopping streets, and count 35 
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million visitors every year. The product offering features both house brands and external 
brands, spanning from apparel to home and cosmetics. The increasing focus on external brand 
has been part of the repositioning plan wanted by PAI Partners and the new CEO Stefano 
Beraldo, and that brought a substantial improvement in store EBITDAs. Coin’s client base is 
mostly aged between 25 and 65 years old, with a predominance of female over male clients. 
The financial performance of Coin has not been as strong as that of OVS, reflecting the lower 
profitability of the department store market. 
 
 € mln 2010 2015 Growth 
Net Sales 302.8 362.2 19.6% 
Concessions 125.9 n/a n/a 
Stores (#) 56 39 -30.4% 
 
Source: Company Financials 
However, the slowly increasing net sales were compensated by an increasingly higher revenue 
from concessions, which have gained relevance as the repositioning process comes to an end. 
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4.3. Valuation 
Gruppo Coin was listed on the Italian Stock Exchange and was trading at €7.25 when BC 
Partners launched its offer to purchase the company. Its market capitalization totalled just more 
than 1 billion, with an EV of 1.5 billion. The share price rose from €2 per share in March 2009 
to €7.25 thanks to the overperformance of Coin and OVS compared to the expectations, the 
acquisition of Upim and the announcement of the intention of PAI Partners to sell its stake in 
the Group. 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research 
At that price, Gruppo Coin had an EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.3x, compared to other national 
apparel retailers that traded at a 6.6x multiple. This overpricing was due to the factors described 
above, and was taken into account by BC Partners when evaluating the business. 
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Keeping in mind that PAI Partners acquired the Group at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.5x, they 
performed the following multiples analysis: 
€ mln Market Cap EV EV/EBITDA 
Gruppo Coin 1037 1459 7.3 
Peers     6.6 
    
International Apparel 
H&M 43028 40712 12.8 
Inditex 38902 36507 12.6 
Esprit 4717 4312 7.1 
Benetton 877 1583 5.2 
Average     9.4 
Median     9.9 
    
National Apparel 
Next 4416 5058 6.4 
Etam 340 648 5.9 
Camaieu 927 919 5.2 
Ted Baker 345 334 9.0 
Average     6.6 
Median     6.2 
    
Department Stores 
Debenhams 1095.8 1089 5.2 
M&S 7134 10281 6.2 
Average   5.7 
Median     5.7 
 
The median and average values of EV/EBITDA multiples of national apparel companies were 
respectively 6.2x and 6.6x, while the department store business had a lower multiple of 5.7x. 
Combining these results, the fact that the stock price of Gruppo Coin increased vertiginously 
and that PAI Partners acquired the Group at the 6.5x multiple, BC Partners decided that the 
final valuation would be of €6.5 per share, signalling an EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.4x. 
€ mln   
EBITDA  202.5  
EV/EBITDA  6.4x  
EV  1,293  
NFP  363  
Equity value  930  
Share Outstanding (mln)  143  
Price per share (€)  6.50  
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4.4. BC Partners Role 
BC Partners contributed to the success of Gruppo Coin in multiple ways. The most notable 
events under BC Partners' control are the following: the buyout of the group and the delisting 
of Gruppo Coin, the corporate reorganisation, the listing of OVS S.p.A. and the acquisition of 
the Swiss firm Charles Vögele. We will analyse in depth these events and highlight how they 
created value for the company. 
4.4.1. 	2011	Buyout	and	Delisting	
Before the actual purchase of Gruppo Coin, BC Partners had to go through a competitive 
bidding process. The first round bidders included CVC, TPG, Bain Capital, Carlyle and 
Goldman Sachs other than BC Partners, but the firm’s expertise in the Italian retail market set 
it apart from its competitors. After the first round, BC Partners was left alone to dialogue with 
Gruppo Coin, and was able to finally reach a deal at the end of June, 2011 (Ivashina, 2016). In 
the same month BC Partners announced the acquisition of 78.7% of share capital of Gruppo 
Coin for €730 million, valuing the company at 6.4x EV/LTM EBITDA, €6.5 per share and an 
overall equity value of €930 million. At the moment of the acquisition, 21.3% of Gruppo Coin’s 
shares traded on the stock market for €7.50, but BC Partners launched a mandatory tender offer 
of only €6.50 per share. Despite this undervaluation, BC Partners was able to purchase more 
than 95% of the capital of Gruppo Coin. The adherence rate was so high because investors 
understood that the floating shares of Gruppo Coin could not be the base for thorough valuation, 
and therefore that the €7.50 per share was not realistic. Once the 95% ownership threshold was 
passed, BC Partners became entitled by law2 to purchase also the remaining share of capital. In 
the September of 2011 Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock Market, suspended Gruppo Coin from 
the trading, and marked the conclusion of the deal with the complete control of BC Partners 
over the Group. 
A new facility agreement, replacing the one executed in 2007, was arranged by a group of eight 
banks, including three Italian banks: Banca IMI, Mediobanca, and UniCredit, as well as Credit 
Agricole, BNP Paribas, HSBC, Natixis, and UBS, which put together two staple financing 
options including a change of control clause and expiring in 2012. 
The EUR 985 million financing included a senior secured packaged comprised of: 
(i) EUR 160 million six-year revolving credit facility (RCF); 
(ii) EUR 290 million six-year Term Loan A (TLA); 
(iii) EUR 25 million six-year capital expenditure facility; 
                                                
2 art. 111 TUF, Testo Unico della Finanza 
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(iv) EUR 475 million seven-year bullet Term Loan B (TLB). The revolving line, TLA, 
and the Capex facility would pay 450 bps over LIBOR (gross of fees). TLB would 
cost 500 bps over LIBOR, with a LIBOR floor of 150 bps. Each of the arranging 
banks retained about EUR 80 million, with about EUR 300 million syndicated to a 
mixture of banks and funds. The loan was slightly oversubscribed thanks to the 
strong appetite of Italian banks, which was partly attributed to the fact that it was 
the only Italian deal in the busy European market. 
4.4.2. Corporate	Reorganisation	
BC Partners’ role was not limited to the operational and financial aspects, but involved also a 
corporate reorganisation project. In January 2013 the subsidiaries Oviesse S.p.A., Coin S.p.A., 
Upim S.r.l., Oviesse Franchising S.p.A. and Coin Franchising S.p.A. were merged into Gruppo 
Coin S.p.A and in April 2014 the business unit consisting of the "division OVS-UPIM" was 
separated from the rest of the business, assigning it to the company OVS S.p.A. 
 
 
Corporate Structure in 2012 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Structure in 2017 
Oviesse S.p.A. Coin S.p.A. Upim S.r.l.
Oviesse Franchising 
S.p.A.
Coin Franchising 
S.p.A.
Gruppo Coin S.p.A.
OVS Upim Coin Coin ExcelsiorCoincasa
Gruppo Coin 
S.p.A.
Coin S.r.l.OVS S.p.A.
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This reorganization is not casual, but it’s due to the multi format retailer business model. 
Gruppo Coin’s main brands OVS-Upim and Coin have different markets and different 
competitors, and the synergies between them do not justify a conglomerated structure. The exit 
options for the whole Group are limited since it does not fit most strategic acquirers’ formats, 
so BC Partners found the solution in separating the two businesses. A brake-up sale of the OVS 
in the apparel business and Coin in the department store businesses (lower multiple) could 
represent a potential upside for the exit value, particularly if Coin was merged with La 
Rinascente. 
Valuation at exit will depend on: 
(i) the like for like growth profile, meaning the performance of current stores excluding 
new openings and conversions; 
(ii) the possibility to open new stores; 
(iii) the international profile of the business; 
(iv) the expected growth once further acquisitions are made and store roll-out is 
complete. 
It is possible that, even in the case of a break-up sale, Gruppo Coin will still struggle to find an 
industrial buyer, as there is a clear lack of track record of sizable international M&A activity in 
the apparel and department store space. Even though the exit profile is not the most appealing 
one, it needs to be considered that the entry valuation incorporated the limited exit options, with 
a price per share that discounted the trading price by almost 15%. 
4.4.3. Listing	of	OVS	S.p.A.	
On the 2nd of March 2015, BC Partners (BC Partners, 2015)  and OVS (OVS, 2015) published 
a press release  where they announced the listing of OVS S.p.A. on the Mercato Telematico 
Azionario (MTA) in Milan, and announced the  following price and conditions of the offer: 
(i) offering price of €4.10 per share; 
(ii) global Offering of 101,000,000 shares, for total consideration of approximately €414 
million; 
(iii) market capitalisation of approximately €931 million, translating to an Enterprise Value 
of approximately €1.3 billion; 
(iv) IPO proceeds used to fund future growth and improve the capital structure by reducing 
debt; 
(v) BC Partners has not sold any shares in the IPO process. 
The offering price has been set at €4.10 per share for a total consideration of approximately 
€414 million, gross of fees and costs related to the transaction. The Global Offering has been 
successfully completed on February 24, 2015, with demand for 226,832,292 Shares by 5,233 
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investors and total demand which exceeded approximately 2 times the amount of shares been 
offered (OVS, 2015). The total amount of shares to be sold at the IPO make up for 47.9% of 
the total capital of OVS S.p.A., leaving BC Partners as the majority shareholder. 
This move from BC Partners confirms its initial plans to dismiss the apparel business and the 
department store business separately, in order to capture the higher multiples of the apparel 
market. The plan was successful, as OVS was span off at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.7x, 
compared to the 6.4x multiple that BC Partners paid to acquire the whole Group. Later on in 
2016, BC Partners sold 25 million shares, corresponding to 10% of OVS S.p.A. capital, at €5.68 
per share through an accelerated bookbuilding sponsored by UniCredit, reaching a stake of 
42.1%. In May 2017, BC Partners sold down another 25 million ordinary shares through the 
same process, with Goldman Sachs and UniCredit as sponsors of the operation. The selling 
price was €6.11 per share, which valued the company at a 9.3x multiple EV/EBITDA multiple. 
4.4.4. Charles	Vögele	Acquisition	
As mentioned before, BC Partners saw international expansion as a potential positive 
contributor to the valuation of the apparel business. Although this strategy failed in the 2000-
2003 attempt, the private equity fund decided to make a second attempt with the new CEO 
Stefano Beraldo and after OVS S.p.A. had gained expertise in M&A with a track record of four 
successful acquisitions3 carried out in only 2 years. All the acquisitions targeted firms that were 
breakeven at the time of acquisition, and were successfully turned around by implementing 
OVS Industry format and by integrating them in the sourcing platform of the Group. 
 On the 19th of September 2016, OVS S.p.A. announced the launch of a recommended public 
tender offer for the Swiss firm Charles Vögele Holding AG in partnership with two other 
investors, Aspen Trust Services Ltd. and Retails Investment S.r.l. OVS S.p.A. made an overall 
investment of CHF 14.1 million to acquire a 35% stake in Sempione Retail AG, the holding 
company that announced the all cash public tender offer at CHF 6.38 per share for all publicly 
held shares of the Swiss firm Charles Vögele Holding AG. OVS was be granted an option to 
purchase a further 44.5% stake in Sempione Retail from Retails Investment from the third year 
following the acquisition of the shares. After the successful completion of the offer, that reached 
a participation rate of more than 95%, Sempione Retail delisted Charles Vögele from the SIX 
Swiss Exchange. 
The fairness of the option price has been assured by Ernst&Young, that performed a DCF 
valuation in order to derive the equity value of the firm. Because of the negative EBITDA that 
Charles Vögele has had since 2010, it was not possible to carry out a multiple based valuation. 
                                                
3 Melablu in 2008, DEM in 2009, Upim in 2010 and Magnolia in 2010 
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Firstly, the WACC was calculated in order to discount correctly the future cash flow: 
Market Risk Premium 6,00%    
Levered Equity Beta 0,766  Risk Free Rate 1,03% 
Equity Risk Premium 4,60%  Credit Spread 1,45% 
Risk Free Rate 1,03%  Cost of Debt 2,48% 
Size Premium 3,74%  (1-tax rate) 80% 
Cost of Equity 9,37%  
Cost of Debt (post 
tax) 1,98% 
     
Equity/(D+E) 88,68%  Debt/(D+E) 11,32% 
     
WACC 8,53%    
Source: EY Fairness Option Document 
Then, the DCF model was implemented, resulting in the following valuation: 
Charles Vögele CHF 000 
Sum of present values of FCFs  105,409  
Terminal value  151,329  
Present value of taxloss carryforward  4,677  
Enterprise Value  261,415  
Net Financial Debt -200,594  
Provisions as of 31.07.2016 -10,282  
Equity Value  50,539  
Number of shares outstanding  8,536,601  
Share price in CHF  5.9  
Source: EY Fairness Option Document 
From the operational perspective, Charles Vögele is a Swiss apparel retailer with a turnover of 
about CHF 800 million in 2015 and a network of approximately 760 stores in seven European 
countries: Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. 
The market in which the company operates, the Swiss market, is down by -8% in the first half-
year 2016 with competition, price pressure and the rising share of online shopping 
fundamentally changing the European landscape in apparel retail. The strategic cooperation 
with OVS will fuel the initiated turnaround measures on assortment, brand and efficiency, in 
line with OVS's previous acquisitions. Charles Vögele will enter into a cooperation agreement 
with OVS aimed at the introduction of OVS brands and merchandising in Switzerland, Austria, 
Slovenia and Hungary through a defined conversion plan. The business in Belgium is currently 
under disposal and Charles Vögele Germany will be sold to a European retailer. Furthermore, 
all the Swiss real estate assets will be sold to and leased back in order to reduce the leverage of 
Charles Vögele. In return to the use of the OVS brand and format, royalties will be granted 
from Charles Vögele to OVS S.p.A. based on the turnover generated. The CEO Stefano Beraldo 
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stressed with emphasis how the two firms are highly compatible in the quality of the store 
locations, store sizes and target customers, making this acquisition strategic for the international 
development of OVS S.p.A in Switzerland and Austria, two interesting and stable markets. The 
acquisition will not increase the financial leverage of OVS S.p.A., as only equity was used for 
the investment. 
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4.5. Exit 
By reorganising the corporate structure and listing OVS S.p.A., BC Partners has already started 
the exit process in which it will realise the gains of these last six years. With a remaining stake 
of only 30% and a liquid market for its shares, OVS S.p.A. is not the priority anymore and does 
not require a significant effort to dismiss. 
Coin is now the focus for BC Partners, that has to find an adequate exit channel for its 
dismission. A recent article (Festa, 2017) announced that BC Partners has appointed the 
Investment Bank Rotschild to look for potential buyers, that could be industrials, another 
private equity fund or a sovereign wealth fund. Market rumours say that a Chinese buyer 
operating in the distribution channel has initiated the contracting for the purchase of the Coin 
brand and its 40 stores. A possible confirmation of the interest of BC Partners in selling Coin 
is that, with effect from the 1st of January 2017, Gruppo Coin S.p.A. has completed the process 
of conferment of the business unit relating to the brands Coin, Coin Exclesior, Coincasa in Coin 
S.r.l., which is entirely participated by Gruppo Coin S.p.A. By conferring this business unit in 
a single legal entity, the sale of the business and its related brands would result much easier and 
smoother, as it would be possible to purchase these brands and the related assets relating by 
acquiring Coin S.r.l. only. 
The definitive exit from Coin and OVS would mark another historical milestone for the Venice 
based companies, that has grown under three different ownerships and has drastically changed 
identity from 1919 to the present days. 
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